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Research on cognitive biases in depression has provided considerable evidence for
the impact of emotion on cognition. Individuals with depression tend to preferentially
process mood-congruent material and to show deficits in the processing of positive
material leading to biases in attention, memory, and judgments. More research is needed,
however, to fully understand which cognitive processes are affected. The current study
further examines the impact of emotion on cognition using a priming design with facial
expressions of emotion. Specifically, this study tested whether the presentation of facial
expressions of emotion affects subsequent processing of affective material in participants
with major depressive disorder (MDD) and healthy controls (CTL). Facial expressions
displaying happy, sad, angry, disgusted, or neutral expressions were presented as primes
for 500ms, and participants’ speed to identify a subsequent target’s emotional expression
was assessed. All participants displayed greater interference from emotional vs. neutral
primes, marked by slower response times to judge the emotion of the target face when
it was preceded by an emotional prime. Importantly, the CTL group showed the strongest
interference when happy emotional expressions served as primes whereas the MDD
group failed to show this bias. These results add to a growing literature that shows that
depression is associated with difficulties in the processing of positive material.
Keywords: affective priming, cognitive biases, depression
Cognitive theories of depression propose that individuals with
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) show mood-congruent cog-
nitive biases, typically giving preference to the processing of
negative vs. positive material. According to Beck (1967), nega-
tive biases in MDD stem from stable cognitive patterns, termed
schemata, which serve as negative filters through which individ-
uals view themselves, the world, and others. Cognitive theories
further highlight the interconnectedness of negative schemata in
depression, which leads to automatic and efficient processing of
mood-congruent information (Ingram, 1984). Thus, the presence
of a negative stimulus will easily activate other negative thoughts
and memories in depression. It is this high degree of intercon-
nectedness of negative vs. positive information that is believed
to heighten risk for the onset and maintenance of depressive
episodes (e.g., Ingram, 1984; Taylor and Ingram, 1999), high-
lighting the importance of examining the effect of emotion on
cognition.
The interconnection of mood-congruent material has been
tested using affective priming designs (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986;
Murphy and Zajonc, 1993). In a typical affective priming experi-
ment, two words (referred to as prime and target) are presented
sequentially, and participants are asked to indicate the valence
of the target as quickly as possible. The speed with which peo-
ple respond to the target is believed to be dependent on the
prime. People typically demonstrate a priming effect: they process
the target faster when the prime is valence-congruent (e.g., both
prime and target are positive) compared to when the prime
valence-incongruent (e.g., prime is neutral but target is positive).
Priming occurs because the prime activates other information
of the same valence (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986). The more closely
interconnected valence-congruent information, the faster people
will respond to the target. Previous studies have shown that the
presentation of a prime can affect feelings, thoughts, and action
tendencies (e.g., Neely, 1991; Bargh et al., 1996).
Given that negative information is more closely interconnected
in depression, cognitive theories propose that depressed com-
pared to control participants will show stronger priming for
negative stimuli; however, priming studies in depression have
not yielded consistent results. Bradley et al. (1995), for exam-
ple, used a lexical decision task with subliminal primes, and
found greater priming for negative words in depressed vs. con-
trol participants. In contrast, Matthews and Southall (1991) did
not find priming from negative words in depression despite
using a similar design. Null findings have also been reported
in several other studies using subliminal primes (Koschack
et al., 2003; Dannlowski et al., 2006a). Interestingly, Dannlowski
et al. (2006b) found evidence of reverse priming, or interfer-
ence. The authors examined the impact of prime words on
how quickly participants judged the valence (positive or nega-
tive) of the targets. Rather than responding faster on congruent
prime-target trials, depressed participants were slower to judge
the valence of negative target words following negative primes.
Taken together, studies do not provide consistent evidence of
enhanced priming of negative concepts in depression, which
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stands contrary to predictions made by cognitive theories of
depression.
Difficulties obtaining priming effects could be related to the
length of time the prime is presented. Priming studies in depres-
sion traditionally have examined the automatic activation of
schemata by presenting primes subliminally. Many studies on
cognitive processing in depression, however, have reported that
biases are more consistently found at later stages of processing
(e.g., see Mathews and MacLeod, 2005, for a review). With this
in mind, to better understand cognitive biases in MDD, stimuli
may have to be presented for longer durations to allowmore elab-
orative processing of the material. The current study, therefore,
examined how emotional information presented for a prolonged
period of time affected the processing of subsequent emotional
targets.
In addition, the choice of stimuli may affect priming effects
in depression. Thus far, the majority of studies have utilized word
stimuli (e.g., Bradley et al., 1995; Dannlowski et al., 2006b). Given
the importance of deficits in social functioning in the mainte-
nance and recurrence of depression (Blair, 2003), facial expres-
sions may provide stronger andmore relevant stimuli than words.
The ability to quickly and accurately identify facial expression
of emotions is critical for successful interpersonal functioning
(e.g., Hess et al., 1988). Increasing evidence suggests important
differences in the way depressed and control participants pro-
cess facial expressions. In fact, results from both behavioral and
neuroimaging studies highlight that depressed individuals differ
from healthy controls (CTL) in the processing of facial expres-
sions. Some studies have reported that depressed participants
exhibit global deficits when processing facial expressions of emo-
tion (e.g., Feinberg et al., 1986), whereas others indicate that
MDD is associated with difficulty identifying specific emotions
(e.g., happy but not sad; Suslow et al., 2001). Moreover, results
from neuroimaging studies indicate that, compared to healthy
controls, depression is associated with a different pattern of neu-
ral responses to happy vs. sad expressions (e.g., Surguladze et al.,
2005) as well as differential neural responses to facial expression
of disgust (e.g., Surguladze et al., 2010). Given the substan-
tial evidence suggesting the importance of facial processing in
the severity, persistence, and relapse of depressive episodes (e.g.,
Hale, 1998; Bouhuys et al., 1999a,b), it might be particularly
relevant to examine priming effects using facial expressions of
emotion.
The current study used a priming design to test the impact
of emotion on participants’ speed to cognitively process sub-
sequent information. Emotional primes were presented for a
prolonged period of time to allow thorough processing, and
we tested the impact of these primes on participants’ speed
to identify a subsequent congruent or incongruent target. We
predicted that all individuals would show priming effects, evi-
denced by faster processing of targets when the prime is of
congruent valence compared to a neutral prime. However,
we expected depressed participants, compared to healthy con-
trols, to show especially strong priming effects for negative
vs. positive material, thereby highlighting the enhancing effect




Adults between the ages of 18 and 60 were recruited via newspa-
per advertisements and Internet postings. Potential participants
were screened over the phone for initial inclusion and exclusion
criteria. Two groups of individuals were included in the study:
participants who met DSM-IV criteria for MDD and participants
who did not meet criteria for a current or past Axis I disorder
(CTL). Individuals were excluded if they had severe head trauma,
a learning disability, or met DSM-IV criteria for bipolar disorder,
alcohol abuse, or substance abuse with the past 6 months. After
participants provided informed consent, diagnoses, and exclusion
criteria were confirmed in the laboratory by trained and expe-
rienced interviewers using the Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-IV (SCID; First et al., 1996). Based on the SCID, 19 MDD




Pictures were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional
Faces (Lundqvist et al., 1998), which consisted of black-and-
white photographs of Caucasian individuals portraying a variety
of facial expressions. For the current study, we selected 29 male
and 28 female faces depicting neutral, happy, sad, angry, and dis-
gusted expressions. Pictures of 11 additional models were used
during the practice trials. All pictures were cropped just below the
chin, above the hairline, and at the start of each ear. Pictures were
approximately 8 cm× 10 cm in size and each pair was presented
approximately 14 cm apart (measured from their centers).
Design
In the priming task (adapted from Yoon and Zinbarg, 2007),
photograph pairs were presented sequentially on the computer
screen using eprime software. Each trial began with “Ready” dis-
played for 500ms in white text in the center of a black computer
screen. Next, the first photograph (the prime) was presented in
the center of the screen for 500ms. Participants were asked to
attend to the prime photograph, but they did not need to take
any action. Immediately following the offset of the prime, a sec-
ond photograph (the target) of a different actor was displayed
in the center of the screen. The target photograph remained on
the screen until participants judged the valence (positive or nega-
tive) of the facial expression using the 1 and 2 keys of a standard
keyboard’s number pad. Participants’ reaction time to judge the
valence of the target face was used to calculate the priming score
(see below). The key 1 was partially covered with a sticker labeled
N for negative valence, and the key 2 was partially covered with
a sticker labeled P for positive valence. Participants were asked
to use these keys to make their valence ratings as quickly and as
accurately as possible. To test our hypothesis, it was critical to
ensure that participants were consciously processing the prime
and target facial expressions. For that reason, after both pho-
tographs went off the screen, participants saw a screen displaying
the question, “Which picture was friendlier?” The accuracy of
participants’ response provided a check of their attention to both
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photographs. Participants then judged whether the first or sec-
ond face was friendlier. Participants used the 1 and 2 keys of
the number pad to make their friendly judgment: 1 indicated
the first face was friendlier, and 2 indicated the second face was
friendlier. Participants completed 10 practice trials before going
on to complete 240 task trials.
The target faces depicted happy, sad, angry, or disgusted emo-
tional expressions. For each emotional category, 20 trials were
emotion-emotion (the prime and target displayed the same emo-
tional expression), 20 were neutral-emotion (the prime depicted
a neutral expression but the target depicted an emotional expres-
sion), and 20 were fillers (the prime and target depicted two
different emotional expressions). Filler trials were included in the
design so that emotional primes would not lead to participants
anticipating a target of congruent valence. Given that filler tri-
als consisted of a different number of each prime-target pair type
(e.g., angry-sad vs. angry-disgust, vs. angry-happy) for each par-
ticipant and that we did not expect participants to respond to
negative-negative and negative-positive pair types the same, we
did not include filler trials in the analyses.
QUESTIONNAIRES
BDI
To measure depression severity at the time when the priming task
was administered, participants completed the Beck Depression-
Inventory-II (BDI-II, Beck et al., 1996). This 21-item self-report
measure of the severity of depressive symptoms has shown excel-
lent reliability and validity (α = 0.92; Beck et al., 1996).
PROCEDURE
Participants first came into the laboratory to partake in the SCID,
which took approximately 2 h. Eligible participants were sched-
uled for their second session, which took place typically within
2 weeks of the SCID. During the second session they completed
the priming task and the BDI. The current study was approved by
the University of Miami Internal Review Board (IRB).
RESULTS
PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS
Clinical and demographic characteristics of the participant
groups were examined (see Table 1). First, BDI scores were ana-
lyzed to confirm that MDD participants continued to exhibit
high levels of depression at the time the priming task was com-
pleted. Given that two participants in the MDD group had BDI
scores less than 10, these participants were excluded from fur-
ther analysis. We analyzed data on the remaining 30 CTL and 17
MDD participants. Percent female did not differ between the CTL
and MDD groups, χ2(1,N = 47) = 0.64. Race/ethnicity also did
not differ across the two groups,χ2(4,N = 45) = 4.85. Ethnicity
data are missing from two participants who elected not to pro-
vide this information. In addition, age did not differ in the CTL
and MDD groups, t(45) = 0.86, all p > 0.05. There was, however,
the anticipated significant difference in participants’ BDI scores,
t(45) = 11.11, p < 0.001, with CTL participants obtaining signif-
icantly lower BDI scores than MDD participants. Based on the
SCID, 10 of the MDD participants also met criteria for one or
more DSM-IV disorder, including panic disorder with or without
Table 1 | Participant characteristics.
Variable Group
CTL MDD
Percentage of women 46.67 58.82
Percentage of race/ethnicity − −
American Indian or Alaska native 3.45 0.00
Black or African American 31.03 6.25
White—Non Hispanic or Latino 17.24 31.25
White—Hispanic or Latino 41.38 50.00
Other 6.90 12.50
Age (SD) 37.17 (12.71) 40.59 (13.66)
BDI (SD) 3.13 (4.57)a 29.29 (11.46)a
# WITH COMORBID AXIS-I DISORDERS
Panic disorder with or without
agoraphobia
− 5
Agoraphobia without panic disorder − 1
Social phobia − 3
Specific phobia − 6
Obsessive-compulsive disorder − 1
Posttraumatic stress disorder − 2
Generalized anxiety disorder − 4
Note: CTL, control; MDD, major depressive disorder; BDI, Beck Depression
Inventory-II; participants may have more than one comorbid diagnosis.
ap < 0.001.
agoraphobia, agoraphobia without panic disorder, social pho-
bia, specific phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, posttaumatic
stress disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder.
ATTENTION CHECK
In order to adequately test our hypotheses, it was critical to ensure
participants were consciously processing the prime and target
facial expressions. To check for this, the accuracy with which par-
ticipants judged the relative friendliness of facial expressions was
examined on trials in which neutral facial expressions served as
primes. The frequency that participants judged the emotional
facial expression as more friendly was compared across happy,
sad, angry, and disgusted trials. Friendly ratings are missing for
five participants for whom there was a computer error. A two-
way group (MDD, CTL) by emotion (happy, sad, angry, and
disgusted) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted on number of times the emotional face was judged
friendlier than the neutral face. The main effect of group was
not significant, F(1, 40) = 0.80, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.02. However,
there was a significant main effect of emotion, F(3, 120) = 325.23,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.89, see Table 2. As expected, happy faces were
judged friendlier more often than sad faces, t(41) = 23.64, angry
faces, t(41) = 24.81, and disgusted faces, t(41) = 21.00, all p <
0.001. In addition, sad faces were judged friendlier more often
than angry faces, t(41) = 3.61, and disgusted faces, t(41) = 4.84,
both p < 0.01. In contrast, there was no difference in the fre-
quency with which participants judged angry vs. disgusted faces
friendlier, t(41) = 1.90, p > 0.05. The group by emotion inter-
action also did not reach significance, F(3, 120) = 0.37, p > 0.05,
η2 = 0.01. Thus, the accuracy with which participants attended
to both facial expressions did not differ by group.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 76 | 3
LeMoult et al. Affective priming in MDD
Table 2 | Percent trials emotional face judged friendlier than neutral
face as a function of emotion and group.
Emotion (%) Group
CTL MDD
Happya 92.15 (12.90) 92.50 (14.55)
Sada,b 18.35 (14.90) 22.50 (14.20)
Angrya,b 12.85 (10.80) 12.50 (17.90)
Disgusteda,b 8.00 (8.25) 12.90 (18.05)
aHappy faces were judged friendlier more often than sad faces, angry faces, and
disgusted faces, ps < 0.01.
bSad faces were judged friendlier more often than angry faces and disgusted
faces, ps < 0.01.
PRIMING
To assess priming, reaction times to indicate the target face
valence were examined depending on whether the prime dis-
played a congruent or neutral facial expression. A priming score
was calculated for each emotional expression using the following
equation (see Table 3 for means by trial type):
Priming Score = RT(neutral-emotion)
−RT(emotion-emotion)
Neutral-emotion indicates the prime displayed a neutral expres-
sion; emotion-emotion indicates the prime displayed the same
emotional expression as the target. Therefore, RT (neutral-
emotion) indicates the mean reaction time to indicate the valence
of the target face when the prime is neutral. According to this
formula, larger priming scores indicate people were faster when
prime-target pairs had congruent facial expressions. Response
times from only correct responses were examined. Error rates
were low (less than 10% across all participants). To eliminate
outliers, reaction times exceeding plus or minus one standard
deviation from the mean were eliminated. Percent outlying tri-
als did not differ in the CTL (10.82%) andMDD groups (8.87%),
t(45) < 1, p > 0.05.
To test our main hypothesis regarding depression and prim-
ing from emotional facial expressions, a two-way group (MDD,
CTL) by emotion (happy, sad, angry, and disgusted) repeated-
measures ANOVAwas conducted on priming scores. The ANOVA
yielded a significant main effect of emotion, F(3, 135) = 5.62,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.11, and a significant group by emotion inter-
action, F(3, 135) = 2.88, p < 0.04, η2 = 0.06; see Figure 1. The
main effect of group was not significant, F(1, 45) = 0.04, p >
0.05, η2 = 0.00. Overall, participants displayed a negative prim-
ing score that suggests reverse priming. Reverse priming scores
significantly differed from zero for happy, t(46) = 4.83, angry,
t(46) = 2.24, and disgust faces, t(46) = 2.34 p < 0.05; however,
reverse priming scores did not significantly differ from zero for
sad faces, t(46) < 1, p > 0.05. Between-group follow-up analy-
ses revealed no significant difference between the CTL and MDD
groups’ scores for happy, sad, angry, or disgusted faces [t(45) =
0.50, 1.55, 1.37, and 0.16 respectively, all ps > 0.05]. Within-
group follow-up analyses revealed a significant main effect of
Table 3 | Priming data by emotion and trial type.
Emotion Reaction time (in ms)
Emotion–emotion Neutral–emotion
HAPPY
CTL 1,559.91 (468.26) 1,276.69 (308.09)
MDD 1,385.42 (415.96) 1,176.28 (381.25)
SAD
CTL 1,657.47 (492.67) 1,628.20 (411.99)
MDD 1,466.51 (570.49) 1,434.44 (376.02)
ANGRY
CTL 1,701.37 (469.24) 1,588.27 (402.61)
MDD 1,446.50 (426.11) 1,346.19 (398.14)
DISGUSTED
CTL 1,618.84 (467.57) 1,567.35 (364.22)
MDD 1,492.42 (496.87) 1,282.10 (339.46)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. CTL, control participants; MDD,
participants diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder.
FIGURE 1 | Priming scores for each emotion (angry, disgust, happy,
and sad) for both control (CTL) and depressed (MDD) participants.
Negative priming scores reflect reverse priming or difficulty disengaging
from the emotional compared to neutral primes. Error bars indicate ±1 SE.
∗p < 0.02.
emotion for the CTL group, F(3, 87) = 7.59, p < 0.001, η2 =
0.21. Specifically, CTLs demonstrated greater reverse priming for
happy faces than angry t(29) = 2.50, disgusted t(29) = 3.46, or sad
faces t(29) = 4.30, all p < 0.02. There was no difference in prim-
ing scores for angry faces compared to disgusted t(29) = 0.99,
or sad faces t(29) = 1.71, both p > 0.05. Nor was there a differ-
ence between priming scores for disgusted and sad faces, t(29) =
0.51, p > 0.05. In contrast, follow-up analyses revealed no sig-
nificant main effect of emotion for the MDD group, F(3, 48) =
2.35, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.13, suggesting that MDD participants did
not experience differential priming for happy faces compared to
negative faces.
DISCUSSION
The current study examined the effect of emotion on cognitive
processing in MDD using an affective priming task with pro-
longed presentation of facial expressions of emotion. Participants
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displayed reverse priming for angry, disgusted, and happy expres-
sions: participants took longer to identify emotional faces when
they were preceded by an emotional face of the same valence
vs. preceded by a neutral face. In addition, our analysis yielded
a significant valence by group interaction. CTLs showed greater
reverse priming from happy compared to angry, disgusted, and
sad facial expressions; however, no such valence effect was
obtained in the MDD group. Results suggest that the emotion-
ality of the prime affected cognition in the control group. More
specifically, when CTL participants viewed a happy face first, it
took them longer to process the subsequent happy face. Longer
reaction times could be viewed as evidence of “impaired” cog-
nition; however, when longer reaction times indicate more time
is spent processing positive expressions, it might actually be func-
tional. In fact, dwelling on positive facial expressions may enhance
mood (e.g., Vrugt and Vet, 2009). With this in mind, the fact
that positive expressions are not associated with prolonged cogni-
tion in the MDD group might impair their ability to use positive
expressions to recover from negative mood states.
Although findings of reverse priming are not consistent with
our hypotheses, reverse priming effects have been reported in
several other studies (e.g., Dannlowski et al., 2006b; Klauer
et al., 2009). When interpreting priming results, Bargh and
Chartrand (2000) emphasize the importance of considering the
delay between prime and target presentation. With brief delays
between prime and target (i.e., less than 250ms), Bargh and
Chartrand suggest that only automatic effects should influence
people’s response to the target. The prime should therefore facil-
itate faster responses to congruent targets, as is traditionally
observed in priming studies. As the delay between prime and tar-
get increases, however, strategic and elaborative processing of the
prime is expected to override traditional priming effects. Thus,
the more difficulty people have disengaging from the prime, the
slower they will be to respond to the target. Supporting this,
Klauer and colleagues documented reverse priming effects using
a prime-target delay of 420ms (Klauer et al., 2009), and they
suggest similar reverse priming effects would also be observed
for prime-target delays between 300 and 600ms. In the current
study, 500ms separated the presentation of the prime and tar-
get, which could have allowed attentional capture and elaborative
processing of the prime. Moreover, other studies note the con-
tribution of affectively extreme primes to reverse priming effects
(e.g., Glaser and Banaji, 1999; Dannlowski et al., 2006b). Our
use of facial expressions displaying 100% emotional intensity
may have further encouraged attentional capture. Reverse prim-
ing effects, therefore, likely reflect people’s difficulty disengaging
from angry, happy, and disgusted facial expressions captured by
attention.
In addition, our findings demonstrate greater reverse prim-
ing for happy vs. negative facial expressions in the CTL group,
suggesting that CTLs had particular difficulty disengaging from
positive compared to negative facial expressions. In contrast, the
MDD group showed no effect of prime valence. Our findings are
in line with a growing literature showing that non-depressed par-
ticipants show preferential processing of positive material that is
not present in participants with depression (e.g., Deveney and
Deldin, 2004; Gotlib et al., 2011). Attention capture by positive
information and difficulties disengaging from positive material
in the CTL group may contribute to resilience and to the ability
to repair negative affect (Joormann et al., 2010) and may there-
fore represent an important “cognitive vaccine” against depressed
mood (Holmes et al., 2009). In contrast, the lack of this “vaccine”
in the MDD group might place individuals at increased vulner-
ability to experience prolonged negative mood states. Finding
from the current study also dovetail with results from recent neu-
roimaging research. For example, Surguladze et al. (2005) found
that CTL—but not participants with depression—demonstrated
linear increases in limbic-subcortical and extrastriate visual object
processing regions when processing happy facial expressions. The
authors make important links between neural processing differ-
ences and attentional biases typical of depression (see Mathews
and MacLeod, 2005, for a review). Similarly, whereas participants
with depression showed greater amygdala response to implic-
itly presented sad faces, CTL showed greater amygdala response
to implicitly presented happy faces (Victor et al., 2010), further
highlighting that healthy but not depressed individuals show a
processing bias toward positive stimuli. Research also has demon-
strated associations between anhedonia and neural response to
happy expressions (e.g., Keedwell et al., 2005). More specifi-
cally, anhedonia severity was associated with greater activity in
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and less activity in the amyg-
dala/ventral striatal regions when processing happy expressions.
Future research might therefore examine whether there is a simi-
lar correlation between anhedonia severity and degree of priming
effects for happy faces.
Several limitations in the current study should be noted. Given
the small sample size, it is possible that the follow-up tests were
underpowered to detect differences between the CTL and MDD
groups. Null findings should therefore be interpreted with cau-
tion and replication of the current findings within a larger clinical
sample is warranted. That the group by emotion interaction was
significant despite a potential lack of power, however, speaks
to the strength of this finding. Second, some participants in
the MDD group met criteria for a comorbid diagnosis. Because
the sample size in the current study prevented us from examin-
ing the effects of comorbidity, future research might consider an
a priori examination of the role of comorbid anxiety disorders.
Despite these limitations, the current study provides an impor-
tant look at participants’ disengagement from emotional facial
expressions captured by attention. CTLs had difficulty disen-
gaging from happy compared to negative facial expressions.
Prolonged processing of positive affect might help people regu-
late negative emotions or “vaccinate” them against future negative
mood (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009; Joormann et al., 2010). Moreover,
the bias toward positive facial expressions could facilitate pro-
longed engagement in positive social interactions, which has also
been shown to protect individuals against negative mood (e.g.,
Paykel, 2007). The fact that individuals with MDD failed to show
this protective positive bias might therefore contribute to the
onset and maintenance of depressive episodes.
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